CVE-2026-82726

Permissive Regular Expression vulnerability in ash-project ash_phoenix lets a remote client select the tenant an Ash application uses, or degrade the request, by sending a crafted Host header. AshPhoenix.Helpers.get_subdomain/2 stripped the root domain with String.replace(host, ~r/.?#{root_host}/, ""). The root host was interpolated raw, so each . became a wildcard and any metacharacter a pattern, and the replace was global and unanchored, so a match was removed from anywhere in the string. With root_host example.com, Host: foo.exampleXcom.attacker.net returned the tenant foo.attacker.net. A metacharacter-bearing or nil root host degraded the pattern or raised on every request. The comparison was also case-sensitive, so TENANT.EXAMPLE.COM and EXAMPLE.COM slipped past the root-host allowlist. conn.host comes from the client Host header. The fix matches the root host case-insensitively and only as an exact trailing suffix. This issue affects ash_phoenix: from 2.1.26 before 2.3.25.

No published remediation has been found for this vulnerability's affected products yet.

Mitigation guidance may be in the linked vendor advisories in the References section below.

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