CVE-2026-109400

The InstaWP Connect – 1-click WP Staging & Migration plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 0.1.4.1 This is due to the plugin registering its admin page via `add_management_page()` using a role name returned by `InstaWP_Setting::get_allowed_role()` as the required capability — which WordPress resolves as a real capability match for any user holding that role — combined with `generate_section_field()` rendering the master API key from the `instawp_api_options` option directly as the `value` attribute of a plain-text HTML input with no additional `manage_options` or equivalent capability check. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with Subscriber-level access and above to read the plaintext master API key, use its SHA-256-derived secret as a bearer token accepted by the plugin's REST API `validate_api_request()`, and call `POST /wp-json/instawp-connect/v2/auto-login` to mint a 30-second single-use login URL that sets an administrator authentication cookie — fully escalating their privileges. Exploitation requires the site to be actively connected to InstaWP and an administrator to have added the attacker's role to the plugin's Sync Tab Access list (`instawp_sync_tab_roles`); notably, the settings tab suppression logic only hides the tab when `administrator` is absent from the list entirely, meaning a mixed configuration retaining administrator alongside a lower role still serves the full settings page — including the API key — to the lower-privileged user.

No published remediation has been found for this vulnerability's affected products yet.

Mitigation guidance may be in the linked vendor advisories in the References section below.

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