CVE-2022-48760
HIGHDescription
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: core: Fix hang in usb_kill_urb by adding memory barriers The syzbot fuzzer has identified a bug in which processes hang waiting for usb_kill_urb() to return. It turns out the issue is not unlinking the URB; that works just fine. Rather, the problem arises when the wakeup notification that the URB has completed is not received. The reason is memory-access ordering on SMP systems. In outline form, usb_kill_urb() and __usb_hcd_giveback_urb() operating concurrently on different CPUs perform the following actions: CPU 0 CPU 1 ---------------------------- --------------------------------- usb_kill_urb(): __usb_hcd_giveback_urb(): ... ... atomic_inc(&urb->reject); atomic_dec(&urb->use_count); ... ... wait_event(usb_kill_urb_queue, atomic_read(&urb->use_count) == 0); if (atomic_read(&urb->reject)) wake_up(&usb_kill_urb_queue); Confining your attention to urb->reject and urb->use_count, you can see that the overall pattern of accesses on CPU 0 is: write urb->reject, then read urb->use_count; whereas the overall pattern of accesses on CPU 1 is: write urb->use_count, then read urb->reject. This pattern is referred to in memory-model circles as SB (for "Store Buffering"), and it is well known that without suitable enforcement of the desired order of accesses -- in the form of memory barriers -- it is entirely possible for one or both CPUs to execute their reads ahead of their writes. The end result will be that sometimes CPU 0 sees the old un-decremented value of urb->use_count while CPU 1 sees the old un-incremented value of urb->reject. Consequently CPU 0 ends up on the wait queue and never gets woken up, leading to the observed hang in usb_kill_urb(). The same pattern of accesses occurs in usb_poison_urb() and the failure pathway of usb_hcd_submit_urb(). The problem is fixed by adding suitable memory barriers. To provide proper memory-access ordering in the SB pattern, a full barrier is required on both CPUs. The atomic_inc() and atomic_dec() accesses themselves don't provide any memory ordering, but since they are present, we can use the optimized smp_mb__after_atomic() memory barrier in the various routines to obtain the desired effect. This patch adds the necessary memory barriers.
How to fix
Remediation is compiled from vendor and distribution security advisories. Always confirm against the linked source for your exact version and platform.
CVSS v3 Vector
Exploitability
Impact
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H
Exploit Intelligence
Low risk: more likely to be exploited than 8% of all known CVEs.
References
Related Vulnerabilities
Other CWE-667 vulnerabilities, ordered by exploit likelihood. View all
| CVE | Severity | CVSS | EPSS | Exploited | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2019-10072 | High | 7.5 | 73% | - | Fix |
| CVE-2002-1850 | High | 7.5 | 17% | - | Fix |
| CVE-2009-2699 | High | 7.5 | 14% | - | Fix |
| CVE-2004-0174 | High | 7.5 | 12% | - | - |
| CVE-2009-4272 | High | 7.5 | 11% | - | - |
| CVE-2020-24606 | High | 8.6 | 5.2% | - | Fix |
Embed a live status badge for CVE-2022-48760
Markdown
[](https://tridentstack.com/cve/CVE-2022-48760)HTML
<a href="https://tridentstack.com/cve/CVE-2022-48760"><img src="https://tridentstack.com/cve/badge/CVE-2022-48760.svg" alt="CVE-2022-48760"></a>Find and fix vulnerabilities across your fleet
TridentStack Control continuously scans your Windows, macOS, and Linux fleet for known vulnerabilities, prioritizes them by severity and active exploitation, and patches them automatically.
Start freeThis product uses NVD data but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD. EPSS scores courtesy of FIRST.org (https://www.first.org/epss). Source: CISA KEV Catalog. Data as of 2025-09-17.